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Abstract
This panel draws on research of the teaching of mathematical proof, con-
ducted in five countries at different levels of schooling. With a shared view
of proof as essential to the teaching and learning of mathematics, the authors
present results of studies that explore the challenges for teachers in helping
students learn to reason in disciplined ways about mathematical claims.
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1. Introduction
Proof is central to mathematics and as such should be a key component of
mathematics education. This emphasis can be justified not only because proof is
at the heart of mathematical practice, but also because it is an essential tool for
promoting mathematical understanding.
This perspective is not always unanimously accepted by either mathematicians
or educators. There have been challenges to the status of proof in mathematics itself,
including predictions of the ‘death of proof’. Moreover, there has been a trend in
many countries away from using proof in the classroom (for a survey see Hanna &
Jahnke, 1996).
In contrast to this, the authors of the present paper agree that proof must be
central to mathematics teaching at all grades. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be
learned from the debates over the role of proof. For many pupils, proof is just a
ritual without meaning. This view is reinforced if they are required to write proofs
according to a certain pattern or solely with symbols. Much mathematics teaching
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in the early grades focuses on arithmetic concepts, calculations, and algorithms, and,
then, as they enter secondary school, pupils are suddenly required to understand
and write proofs, mostly in geometry. Substantial empirical evidence shows that
this curricular pattern is true in many countries.
Needed is a culture of argumentation in the mathematics classroom from the
primary grades up all the way through college. However, we need to know more
about the difficulties pupils encounter when they are confronted with proof and
the challenges faced by teachers who seek to make argumentation central to the
mathematics classroom. The epistemological difficulties that confront students in
their first steps into proof can be compared to those faced by scientists in the course
of developing a new theory. At the beginning, definitions do not exist. It is not
clear what has to be proved and what can be presupposed. These problems are
interdependent, and researchers (like students) find themselves in danger of circular
reasoning. In the infancy of a theory, a proof may serve more to test the credibility
or the fruitfulness of an assumption than to establish the truth of a statement. Only
later, when the theory has become mature (or the student has come to feel at home
in a domain), can a proof play its mathematical function of transferring truth from
assumptions to a theorem.
All in all, work is needed in three areas with regard to the teaching of proof.
We need (1) a more refined perception of the role and function of proof in mathe-
matics, including studies of the practices of proving in which active mathematicians
engage (epistemological analysis), (2) a deeper understanding of the gradual pro-
cesses and complexities involved in learning to prove (empirical research) and (3) the
development, implementation and evaluation of effective teaching strategies along
with carefully designed learning environments that can foster the development of
the ability to prove in a variety of levels as from the primary through secondary
grades and up to college level (design research).
We begin in Section 2 with an analysis of what mathematical proof might
involve in the primary grades. Section 3 gives results of a longitudinal study on
the development of proving abilities in grades 8 and 9. Section 4 is based upon an
empirical investigation of college level teaching and shows how the natural habit of
referring to an example can be used as a leverage into the teaching of proof, and
section 5 discusses the idea of ’physical mathematics’ as an environment for the
teaching of proof.
2. What does it take to (teach to) reason in the
primary grades?1
Although the teaching and learning of mathematical reasoning has often been
seen as a focus only beginning in secondary school, calls for improvements in math-
ematics education in the U.S. have increasingly emphasized the importance of proof
and reasoning from the earliest grades (NCTM, 2000, p.56). While some may re-
gard such a focus on reasoning and proof secondary to the main curricular goals
1Author: Deborah Loewenberg Ball
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in mathematics at this level, we consider reasoning to be a basic mathematical
skill. Yet what might ‘mathematical reasoning’ look like with young children, and
what might it take for teachers to systematically develop students’ capacity for such
reasoning? These questions form one strand of our research on the teaching and
learning of elementary school mathematics.
We define ‘mathematical reasoning’ as a set of practices and norms that are
collective, not merely individual or idiosyncratic, and that are rooted in the disci-
pline (Ball & Bass, 2000, 2002; Hoover, in preparation). Mathematical reasoning
can serve as an instrument of inquiry for discovering and exploring new ideas, a
process that we call the reasoning of inquiry. Mathematical reasoning also func-
tions centrally in justifying or proving mathematical claims, a process that we call
the reasoning of justification. It is this latter on which we focus here.
The reasoning of justification in mathematics, as we see it, rests on two foun-
dations. One foundation is an evolving body of public knowledge — the mathe-
matical ideas, procedures, methods, and terms that have already been defined and
established within a given reasoning community. This knowledge provides a point
of departure, and is available for public use by members of that community in
constructing mathematical claims and in seeking to justify those claims to others.
For professional mathematicians, the base of public knowledge might consist of an
axiom system for some mathematical structure simply admitted as given, plus a
body of previously developed and publicly accepted knowledge derived from those
axioms. Hence, the base of public mathematical knowledge defines the grain size
of the logical steps which require no further warrant, that is acceptable within a
given context. The second foundation of mathematical reasoning is mathematical
language—symbols, terms, notation, definitions, and representationsand rules of
logic and syntax for their meaningful use in formulating claims and the networks
of relationships used to justify them. ‘Language’ is used here to refer to the en-
tire linguistic infrastructure that supports mathematical communication with its
requirements for precision, clarity, and economy of expression. Language is essen-
tial for mathematical reasoning and for communicating about mathematical ideas,
claims, explanations, and proofs. Some disagreements stem from divergent or unrec-
onciled uses of terminology, whereas others are rooted in substantive and conflicting
mathematical claims (Crumbaugh, 1998; Lampert, 1998). The ability to distinguish
these requires sensitivity to the nature and role of language in mathematics.
We have been tracing the development of mathematical reasoning in a class
of Grade 3 students (ages 8 and 9) across an entire school year using detailed
and extensive records of the class: videotapes of the daily lessons, the students’
notebooks and tests, interviews with students, and the teacher’s plans and notes.
By comparing the class’s work at different points in time, we are able to discern
growth in the students’ skills of and dispositions toward reasoning. We offer two
brief examples here. Early in the school year, the teacher presented the problem, ‘I
have pennies (one-cent coins), nickels, (five-cent coins), and dimes (ten-cent coins)
in my pocket. Suppose I pull out two coins, what amounts of money might I have?’
The children worked to find solutions to this problem: 2, 6, 10, 11, 15, and 20.
The teacher asked the students whether they have found all the solutions to the
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problem, and how they know. Some students seemed uncertain about the question.
Other students offered explanations: ‘If you keep picking up different coins, you will
keep getting the same answers,’ ‘If you write down the answers and think about it
some more until you have them all.’ The students believed they had found them
all, but it was because they could not find any more. Their empirical reasoning
satisfied them. Moreover, they had neither other ideas nor methods for building a
logical argument which would allow them to prove that this problem (as worded)
had exactly six solutions. They also did not have the mathematical disposition to
ask themselves about the completeness of their results when working on a problem
with finitely many solutions.
In contrast, consider an episode four months later. Based on their work with
simple addition problems, the third graders had developed conjectures about even
and odd numbers (e.g., an odd number plus an odd number equals an even number).
They generated long lists of examples for each conjecture: 3 + 5 = 8, 9 + 7 = 16, 9
+ 9 = 18, and so on. Two girls, amidst this work, argued to their classmates: ‘You
can’t prove that Betsy’s conjecture (odd + odd = even) always works. Because, um,
· · · numbers go on and on forever, and that means odd numbers and even numbers
go on forever, so you couldn’t prove that all of them work.’ The other children
became agitated and one of them pointed out that no other conclusion that the
class had reached had met this standard. Pointing to some posted mathematical
ideas, the product of previous work, one girl questioned: ‘We haven’t even tried
them with all the numbers there is, so why do you say that those work? We haven’t
tried those with all the numbers that there ever could be.’ And other children
reported that they had found many examples, and this showed that the conjecture
was true. But some were worried: One student pointed out that there are ‘some
numbers you can’t even pronounce and some numbers you don’t even know are
there.’ A day later, however, challenged by the two girls’ claim, the class arrived
at a proof. Representing an odd number as a number than can be grouped in twos
with one left over, they were able to show that when you add two odd numbers, the
two ones left over would form a new group of two, forming an even sum:
Figure 1: odd + odd = even
This episode illustrates the important role for definitions. Having a shared
definition for odd and even numbers enabled these young students to establish a
The Teaching of Proof 911
logical argument, based on the structure of the numbers. As one girl explained to
her classmates: ‘All odd numbers if you circle them by twos, there’s one left over, so
if you · · · plus another odd number, then the two ones left over will group together,
and it will make an even number.’ The definition equipped them to transcend
the barrier that ‘numbers go on forever’ because it afforded them the capacity
for quantification over an infinite set. Moreover, this episode shows the students
having developed in their ability to construct, inspect, and consider arguments using
previously established public mathematical knowledge.
Our research on the nature, structure, and development of mathematical rea-
soning has made plain that mathematical reasoning can be learned, and has high-
lighted the important role played by the teacher in developing this capacity. Three
domains of work for the teacher have emerged from our analyses. A first con-
cerns the selection of mathematical tasks that create the need and opportunity for
substantial mathematical reasoning. The two-coin problem, for instance, did not
originally require students to find all the solutions. Asking this transformed an
ordinary problem into one that involved the need to reason mathematically about
the solution space of the problem. The second domain of teachers’ work centers
on making mathematical knowledge public and in scaffolding the use of mathe-
matical language and knowledge. Making records of the mathematical work of the
class (through student notebooks, public postings, etc.) is one avenue, for it helps
to make that work public and available for collective development, scrutiny, and
subsequent use. This includes attention to where and in what ways knowledge is
recorded, as well as how to name or refer to ideas, methods, problems, and solu-
tions. Making mathematical knowledge and language public also requires moving
individuals’ ideas into the collective discourse space. A third domain of work, then,
concerns the establishment of a classroom culture permeated with serious interest
in and respect for others’ mathematical ideas. Deliberate attention is required for
students to learn to attend and respond to, as well as use, others’ solutions or pro-
posals, as a means of strengthening their own understanding and the subsequent
contributions they can make to the class’s work.
Acknowledgement. The work reported here draws on my research with Hy-
man Bass, Mark Hoover, Jennifer Lewis, and Ed Wall, as part of the Mathematics
Teaching and Learning to Teach Project at the University of Michigan. This re-
search has been supported, in part, by grants from the Spencer Foundation and the
National Science Foundation.
3. The complexity of learning to prove deductively2
Deductive mathematical proof offers human beings the purest form of distin-
guishing right from wrong; it seems so transparently straightforward — yet it is
surprisingly difficult for students. Proof relies on a range of ‘habits of mind’—
looking for structures and invariants, identifying assumptions, organising logical ar-
guments — each of which, individually, is by no means trivial. Additionally these
2Author: Celia Hoyles
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processes have to be coordinated with visual or empirical evidence and mathemat-
ical results and facts, and are influenced by intuition and belief, by perceptions
of authority and personal conviction, and by the social norms that regulate what
is required to communicate a proof in any particular situation (see for example,
Clements & Battista, (1992), Hoyles, (1997), Healy, & Hoyles, (2000).
The failure of traditional geometry teaching in schools stemmed at least partly
from a lack of recognition of this complexity underlying proof: the standard prac-
tice was simply to present formal deductive proof (often in a ritualised two-column
format) without regard to its function or how it might connect with students’ in-
tuitions of what might be a convincing argument: ‘deductivity was not taught as
reinvention, as Socrates did, but [that it] was imposed on the learner’ (Freudenthal,
1973, p.402). Proving should be part of the problem solving process with students
able to mix deduction and experiment, tinker with ideas, shift between representa-
tions, conduct thought experiments, sketch and transform diagrams. But what are
the main obstacles to achieving this flexible habit of mind?
I present here some examples of geometrical questions that have turned out
to be surprisingly difficult— even for high- attaining and motivated students. The
analysis forms part of The Longitudinal Proof Project (Hoyles and Kchemann:
http://www.ioe.ac.uk/proof/), which is analysing students’ learning trajectories in
mathematical reasoning over time. Data are collected through annual surveying of
high-attaining students from randomly selected schools within nine geographically
diverse English regions. Initially 3000 students (Year 8, age 13) from 63 schools
were tested in 2000. The same students were tested again in the summer of 2001
using a new test that included some questions from the previous test together with
some new or slightly modified questions. The same students will be tested again in
June 2002 with the similar aims of testing understandings and development.
Question G1 in both Year 8 and Year 9 (see Fig 1), is concerned with how
far students use geometrical reasoning to make decisions in geometry and how far
they simply argue from the basis of perception or what ‘it looks like’ (see Lehrer
and Chazan, 1998; Harel and Sowder, 1998). In both cases a geometric diagram
is presented, which in the particular case shown, lends support to a conjecture
that turns out to be false. Students are asked whether or not they agree with the
conjecture and to explain their decision.
Responses to question G1 were coded into 6 broad categories. Surprisingly, a
large number of students in both years simply answered on the basis of perception
and agreed with the false conjecture with no evidence of progress over the year(Yr
8: 40%, Yr 9: 48%). Additionally 41% in Yr 8 could come up with a correct answer
and explain this by reference to an explicit counter-example while only 28% could
do this in Yr 9.
Further analysis, however, is thought-provoking. Responses to Yr8G1 showed
evidence of three effective strategies: the first to find the most extreme case that
obviously shows that the diagonals cannot cross at the centre of the circle; the
second to use dynamic reasoning, that is perturbate the diagram in an incremental
way, keeping the given properties invariant (e.g., moving one of the vertices round
the circumference so the intersection of the diagonals can no longer be at the centre),
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the third is to focus on the diagonals rather than the quadrilateral and simply to
say ‘I can find opposite vertices such that the diagonals do not go thru the centre’
also evidenced by students who simply drew a diagonals ‘cross’ without bothering
to draw the quadrilateral itself! In answer to Yr9G1, it is harder to find a counter
example in a static way as two conditions have to be controlled (neither diagonal
can bisect the area) rather than only one (one diagonal must not go thru centre);
also it is not possible to find as ’extreme’ a counter example as in Y8 (the nearest
equivalent is a concave quadrilateral, though here it is still possible to end up with
two triangles that look very different but have roughly the same area). The second
strategy is also harder in the Year 9 question as the dynamic reasoning has to
change an area, not an immediately obvious quantity unlike the coincidence of two
points. Clearly avoiding the seduction of perception is only one pitfall in geometrical
reasoning.
914 D. L. Ball C. Hoyles H. N. Jahnke N. Movshovitz-Hadar
Figure 2: Question Y8G1 (top) and Y9G1: Distinguishing per-
ceptual from geometrical reasoning
We also found that while students did not easily learn over time to reject
perception, they did improve in calculation. Both Yr 8 and Yr 9 surveys included a
question that required knowledge of certain angle facts (angle on a straight line or
at a point, interior angle sum of triangle; angle property of isosceles triangle) and
where a 3-step calculation had to be performed to find the size of an angle. We
deliberately restricted the task to working with specific numerical values rather than
asking students to derive a general relationship as would be required in a standard
geometric proof, as this would simply be too hard for our students who have little
experience of proving.
First, we note that students made considerable progress in their performance
onthe calculation part of the question (from 54% correin Yr 8 to 73% in Yr 9). But
on analysing responses to the Yr 9 question, (see Figure 2), where we had asked
students to give reasons for each step of their calculation, we discovered that not
only did they find it hard to match a step in the calculation to a reason but also
they were confused by what it means to give a reason. Many students interpreted
’reasons’ in ways that we did not anticipate: that is, as an explanation for the step
that they had taken(‘u is 40 as I took 40 from 360’), or as request to make their
plans explicit (‘I started with p= 320 as the only thing that I know and I took it
from 360 to find u’).
Our research is uncovering many more surprises in both student response and
progress in proving — in geometry but also in algebra (One of our questions (for
14 year-olds) concerns the sum of odd numbers and shows a remarkably similar
spread of responses as those described by Deborah Ball for children age 8/9 years.
We know now even more about potential obstacles to ‘learning the mathematical
game’; but need more systematic work on progress over time. there are no fool-proof
approaches and no short cuts or easy solutions.
Acknowledgement. I acknowledge the contribution of Dietmar Kchemann
in all the research reported here supported by the Economic and Social Research
Council (ESRC), Project number R000237777.
4. The ‘Because for example · · · ’phenomenon, or
transparent pseudo-proofs revisited3
This panel is about the teaching of proof in mathematics, or as I interpret it
— providing adequate conditions for gaining mathematics knowledge. My presen-
tation is based upon the assumption that mathematics knowledge is in principle not
different than any other kind of knowledge, although, of course, the nature of the
discipline is different. What, then, is knowledge? According to Brook and Stainton
(2001), a common, long standing and most plausible answer, given by philosophers
to this question, is that in order to be one’s knowledge a proposition must comply
3Author: Nitsa Movshovitz-Hadar
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with three necessary (albeit not sufficient) conditions:
(i) It must be true.
(ii) One must believe it. And
(iii) One must have justification for believing it.
Hanna and Jahnke (1993) suggest that in particular for a novice, a preliminary
step towards appreciating what it is that is being justified, illumination — namely
understanding and believing, is of maximum importance. Bertrand Russell makes
an important distinction: Minds do not create truth or falsehood. They create
beliefs. What makes a belief true is its correspondence to a fact, and this fact
does not in any way involve the mind of the person who holds the belief. This
correspondence ensures truth, and its absence entails falsehood. ’Hence we account
simultaneously for the two facts that beliefs (a) depend on minds for their existence,
(b) do not depend on minds for their truth· · · ’ (Russell, 1912).
We conclude that for a true mathematical statement, i.e., a theorem, to become
one’s mathematics knowledge, the learning environment must consist of teaching
tools and strategies that support the development of two properties: (a) One’s belief
in its truth; and (b) one’s ability to justify this belief, that is an ability not just to
formally prove it, but also to ensure its truth by pointing out its correspondence to
facts. Said differently, given a statement p of a mathematical theorem, a learner
should be able to relate to two basic questions: (a) ‘Do you believe that p?’ and,
provided the learner’s answer to (a) is yes, (b)‘Why do you believe that p?’
Quite often students’ reply to the earlier question is of the form: ‘Yes, because
for example · · · ’. Very seldom do the examples that follow, reflect full ability to
verify the truth or even a partial understanding of it. For example, ‘Yes, the sum
of every two even integers is an even integer, because for example 6 plus 8 is 14’,
does not reflect any insight into the general case, although it does attest to an
understanding of the statement, (which cannot be said about the reply: ‘Yes, for
example, because 14 is the sum of 6 and 8’ !) The answer: ‘Yes, because for example
6, which is 2×3, plus 8, which is 2×4, give 14, which is 2×7’, is slightly better but
not quite. It ties the belief to some acquaintance with the property of evenness.
Although it may be based on deep understanding, it does not exhibit more than
accepting the general claim as true, possibly due to a message from an external
authority. (See also Mason 2001, about warrants and the origins of authority.) To
be counted as ‘satisfactory’ the answer should be something like: ‘Yes, because
for example 6, which is 2×3, plus 8, which is 2×4, give 2×(3+4) and this IS an
even number, as it is a multiple of 2.’ This latter one illustrates what we named a
transparent pseudo-proof.
A transparent proof, is a proof of a particular case which is ‘small enough
to serve as a concrete example, yet large enough to be considered a non-specific
representative of the general case. One can see the general proof through it because
nothing specific to the case enters the proof.’ Because a transparent proof is not
a completely polished proof, this kind of ‘proof’ was later re-named Transparent
Pseudo-Proof or as abbreviated: Transparent P-Proof. (Movshovitz-Hadar, 1988,
1998).
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The delicate pedagogy involved in preparing a transparent p-proof was the
focus of my ICME-8 Seville presentation (Movshovitz-Hadar 1998). That paper
presents the lessons learned through experimental employment of two slightly dif-
ferent pseudo-proofs, both of them deserving the title ‘P-Proof Without Words’, yet
only one of which — ‘transparent’. The 1998 Samose presentation (ibid) included
further insight into the notion of transparent p-proof, gained through the prepa-
ration of transparent p-proofs as pedagogical tools to be used in first year linear
algebra course, at Technion - Israel Institute of Technology.
The study of the impact of using transparent p-proofs went on for four years,
and yielded interesting results (Malek, in preparation). Numerous personal inter-
views of first-year mathematics majors and engineering students taking a linear
algebra course, with exposure to transparent p-proofs, yielded clear evidence as to
the impact of reading a transparent p-proof, on undergraduate students’ ability
to write, immediately afterwards, a formal proof of the same claim. A continuing
follow-up also yielded comprehensive evidence as to the impact of reading trans-
parent p-proofs, on the (passive) ability to read and comprehend general (formal)
proofs, and most important of all, on the (active) ability to compose general proofs
and write them in a coherent style.
Consequently, we now strongly advocate, wherever it is appropriate, the use
of transparent p-proofs as a pedagogical tool, as it was shown to support both the
development of one’s belief in the truth of mathematical statements and of one’s
ability to justify this belief. However, it cannot be overemphasized that extreme
care must be taken by the instructor in constructing this tool, be it in verbal-
symbolic presentation or in visual-pictorial representation, so that the presentation
is indeed of a transparent proof, namely, it does not hang in any way to the specifics
of the particular case and hence is readily generalizable. The success of the resulting
learning environment in yielding the development of the ability to prove, depends
heavily on elaborate and careful preparation of the tools by the instructor.
Acknowledgement. The research work reported here was carried by Aliza
Malek under my supervision, and was supported by Technion R & D funds.
5. Arguments from physics in mathematical proofs4
Mathematicians often use arguments from physics in mathematical proofs.
Some examples, such as the Dirichlet principle in the variational calculus or
Archimedes’ use of the law of the lever for determining the volumes of solids, have
become famous, and have in fact been regarded by the best mathematicians as
elegant proofs, if not necessarily rigorous. It is only natural, then, that several au-
thors, notably Polya (1954) and Winter (1978), have proposed that arguments from
physics could and should be used in teaching school mathematics. Besides these
publications there are a number of other papers and booklets with examples (see,
for example, Tokieda, 1998). Unfortunately, however, this approach to classroom
teaching has not been sufficiently explored.
4Author: Hans Niels Jahnke
The Teaching of Proof 917
The application of physics under discussion goes well beyond the simple phys-
ical representation of mathematical concepts, and it is also distinct from drawing
general mathematical conclusions by the exploration of a large number of instances.
Rather, this approach amounts to using a principle of physics, such as the unique-
ness of the centre of gravity, in a proof and treating it as if it were an axiom or a
theorem of mathematics.
Let us look at a typical example. The so-called Varignon theorem states that,
given an arbitrary quadrangle ABCD, the midpoints of its sides W, X, Y, Z form a
parallelogram (see figure 3 below). A purely geometrical proof of this result would
divide the quadrangle into two triangles and apply a similarity argument.
Figure 3: Varignon’s theorem
An argument from mechanics, on the other hand, would consider points A,
B, C, D as four weights, each of unit mass, connected by rigid but weightless rods.
Such a system, with a total mass of 4, has a centre of gravity, and it is this which we
need to determine. The two sub-systems AB and CD each have weight 2, and their
respective centres of gravity are their midpoints W and Y. Thus, we may replace
AB and CD by W and Y loaded with mass 2. Since AB and CD make up the whole
system ABCD, its centre of gravity is the midpoint M of WY. In the same way we
can consider ABCD as made up of BC and DA and its centre of gravity must also
be the midpoint of XZ. Since the centre of gravity is unique, this midpoint must
be M. This means that M cuts both WY and XZ into equal parts. Thus WXYZ,
whose diagonals are WY and XZ, is a parallelogram.
The example shows that an argument from physics may
o provide a more elegant proof
o reveal the essential features of a complex
mathematical structure
o point out more clearly the relevance of a theorem
to other areas of mathematics or to other scientific disciplines
o help create a ‘holistic’ version of a proof, one that can be grasped in its
entirety, as opposed to an elaborate mathematical argument hard to survey.
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Frequently, an argument from physics helps to generalize and to arrive at new
theorems. Following the lines of our previous argument, for example, we can deter-
mine the centre of gravity not only for systems with four masses, but also for those
with three, five, six, and so forth. We can also consider three-dimensional configu-
rations and investigate whether we are able to translate the respective statements
about the centre of gravity into a purely geometrical theorem.
There are several reasons why this approach to the teaching of proof should be
further developed and tested. First, it is unquestionable that, worldwide, we need
fresh and possibly more attractive approaches to the teaching of proof. Since using
arguments from physics in a proof is an alternative to the established Euclidean
routine it might be helpful in motivating teachers to rethink their attitude to proof.
Another reason is that present-day mathematical practice displays a signifi-
cant emphasis on experimentation, and it is only right that this be reflected in the
classroom by a similar emphasis on experimental mathematics. But it would be
dangerous from an educational point of view if experimental mathematics were to
be represented in the schools only by ’mathematics with computers.’ Quite to the
contrary: under the heading of experimental mathematics, the curriculum should
include a strong component devoted to the classical applications of mathematics to
the physical world. In cultivating this type of mathematics, students and teachers
should be guided by the question of how mathematics helps to explore and under-
stand the world around us. In this way, the teaching of proof would be embedded in
activities of building models, inventing arguments to the question ’why’, the study
of consequences from assumptions. Working on the border between mathematics
and physics, it could be shown that in quite a few cases we cannot only apply
mathematics to physics, but, vice versa, can use statements from physics for the
derivation of mathematical theorems.
A Canadian and a German group (Gila Hanna, University of Toronto, Hans
Niels Jahnke, Universita¨t Essen) study the potentials and pitfalls of this approach
in Canadian and German classrooms. Questions investigated concern the feasibility
and the acceptance of the approach, given the limited knowledge of physics with
students in both countries. It is also asked whether this approach furthers the
general understanding of proof and whether the students are aware of the difference
between using arguments from physics and the purely empirical appeal to a large
number of instances (Hanna & Jahnke, 2002).
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